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In The Regement of Princes, Hoccleve insists that Chaucer is not only the equal of Cicero as a 
rhetorician and of Vergil as a poet but also the 'bier in philosophic / To Aristotle, in our tonge'.
1
 
Twentieth-century critics have agreed with Hoccleve about Chaucer's preeminence in rhetoric 
and poetry, even though they often disagree with each other about which term best describes his 
genius. And although Hoccleve's praise of Chaucer as the native Aristotle is an exaggeration, 
several scholars have recently examined Chaucer's concern with 'secular ethics', J. D. Burnley's 
term for the 'ethical traditions descending by grace of the twelfth-century ethicii from the 
rational philosophy of the classical past'.
2
 Without denying the fact that poetry is not identical to 
the systematic discourse of philosophy, I wish further to substantiate Hoccleve's claim for 
Chaucer's philosophical acumen by demonstrating the influence of mediaeval ethics on his 
characterizations of the virtuous women in the tales assigned to the Man of Law, the Clerk, the 
Physician and his pilgrim persona. 
 
As I shall show, Chaucer identifies each heroine with one of the four cardinal virtues by 
enhancing, as necessary, those virtuous characteristics of each protagonist already latent in his 
sources. In both name and behaviour, he associates Constance, Virginia and Prudence with the 
ideas about fortitude, temperance and prudence developed by mediaeval moralists from the 
writings of Cicero, Macrobius and the Pseudo-Seneca, Martin of Braga.
3
 Although Griselda's 
name does not so indicate, her behaviour conforms to the traditional definition of justice that 
includes obedience both to God and to superiors as manifestations of this virtue. The affinity of 
each of these heroines with one of the cardinal virtues underlines the thematic relationship 
among these tales. However, only in the case of Prudence, the heroine of the tale which Chaucer 
assigns to his fictional persona, does the resemblance between the protagonist and the cardinal 
virtue exhaust the meaning of the character. Recognizing the way moral philosophy informs the 
characterization of these virtuous women, though, enables readers to appreciate better how 
Chaucer explores the ethical dilemma posed by the unwarranted suffering of the innocent in the 
Man of Law's Tale, the Clerk's Tale, the Physician's Tale, and the Tale of Melibee. 
 
Readers of The Canterbury Tales have long recognized that Constance, as her name indicates, is 
a model of fortitude.
4
 In his definitive article on Chaucer's revision of Trivet, Block shows how 
the poet transforms the chronicle's version into a romance or saint's life by depicting Constance 
as a general, exemplary character representing fortitude rather than a specific, historical one.
5
 In 
keeping with the cardinal virtue she embodies, Constance resists the temptations of adversity and 
prosperity. This association of fortitude with contemptus mundi derives from Cicero's discussion 
in De Officiis: 
 
 
Transmitted to Christian ethics through Ambrose's De Officiis Ministrorum, Cicero's definition 
of fortitude as equanimity under all circumstances proved very influential throughout the Middle 
Ages.
7 
 
Although Chaucer was probably familiar with Cicero's analysis of fortitude, there is no doubt 
that he knew the other locus classicus for mediaeval definitions of the cardinal virtues, 
Macrobius' Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis. In his discussion of the political manifestation of 
this virtue, Macrobius defines fortitude as the transcendence of the vicissitudes of fortune: 
`fortitudinis animum supra periculi metum agere nihilque nisi turpia timere, tolerare fortiter vel 
adversa vel prospera'.
8
 Macrobius identifies constancy as one of the seven species of fortitude, 
and it is his list, rather than Cicero's in De Invention, that Guillaume de Conches includes, with 
slight modifications, in the Moralium Dogma Philosophorum, the twelfth-century adaptation of 
De Officiis popular well into the Renaissance.
9 
 
Both Cicero's and Macrobius' ideas about fortitude are cited in the most thorough and influential 
compendium of late mediaeval views about the four cardinal virtues, Guillemus Peraldus' Summa 
de Virtutibus (c. 1248). Peraldus also quotes the definition of constancy from the Moralium 
Dogma: `Constancia est stabilitas animi firma et in proposito perseverans.'
10
 A similar 
conception of fortitude is presented in the brief discussion of the cardinal virtues in the Summa 
Virtutum de Remediis Anime, Chaucer's source for the section of the Parson's Tale on the 
remedial virtues. Often included in manuscripts as a sequel to Peraldus' companion compendium 
on the vices, the Summa Virtutum or Postquam provides definitions of fortitude from Cicero and 
Augustine which demonstrate the former's influence on the latter.
11 
 
This mediaeval conception of fortitude explains not only Chaucer's characterization of 
Constance, but also his inclusion of the repeated references to fortune in the Man of Law's Tale; 
indeed, the former entails the latter. Though Chaucer takes the story of Constance's suffering 
from Trivet, he realizes the philosophic implications of the chronicle's account. Those rapid 
changes from prosperity to adversity that Constance undergoes throughout the tale become, in 
Chaucer's version, dramatizations of the turning of fortune's wheel. Although the three sea 
voyages occur in Trivet, for example, Chaucer's addition of Constance's prayers before each one 
reveals her fortitude in the face of adversity and emphasizes the Boethian idea of the sea as an 
emblem of fortune's hazards.
12
 In withstanding the uncertain conditions of the sea, Constance 
symbolically endures the vicissitudes of fortune and thus enacts the definition of fortitude in the 
Moralium Dogma Philosophorum: Fortitudo est virtus retundens impetus adversitatis.'
13 
 
Given this mediaeval conception, it seems that Griselda, the heroine of the Clerk's Tale, is an 
even better exemplar of fortitude than Constance, for she withstands the temptations of 
prosperity as well as the sufferings of adversity. Throughout the Clerk's Tale Chaucer refers to 
Griselda's patience and he repeats Petrarch's moral praising her constancy during her trial. 
Undoubtedly, her steadfastness exemplifies one species of fortitude. However, in the case of 
Griselda, fortitude is not her predominant virtue, but the quality which makes possible her 
exercise of obedience in the face of her husband's severe tests. A study of Chaucer's revisions of 
his Latin and French sources shows that it is this latter virtue that is most enhanced by the 
changes he makes. Patience is only the necessary means for Griselda's extraordinary obedience, a 
virtue regarded in the Middle Ages as a species of justice. 
 
Although several critics have commented upon Griselda's obedience,
14
 none has recognized that 
it renders her an example of justice, because modern readers of The Canterbury Tales are 
unfamiliar with the mediaeval conception of this cardinal virtue. Moralists of the Middle Ages 
adopted Cicero's definition of justice from the De Officiis as that virtue 'in hominem societate 
tuenda tribuendoque suum cuique et rerum contractarum fide'.
15
 Cicero repeats the same idea in 
De Inventione, where he writes: 'Iustitia est habitus animi communi utilitate conservata suam 
cuique tribuens dignitatem.'
16
 Augustine and Macrobius both endorse Cicero's emphasis on 
distributive justice, and Abelard, Alain de Lille and Aquinas reiterate it later in the Middle 
Ages.
17 
 
The correspondence between this cardinal virtue and Griselda's behaviour becomes most 
apparent in study of the species or parts of justice. Such investigation is complicated, though, by 
the fact that more schemes of division were proposed for this virtue than for any of the other 
three.
18
 Despite variations in these accounts of the species of justice, however, all the auxiliary 
virtues involve rendering either to God or to fellow-humans whatever is their due. God's due is 
religion, which Cicero defines as `quae superioris cuiusdam naturae, quam divinam vocant, 
curam caerimoniamque affert'.
19
 The other parts of justice govern human relationships; and of 
these, the ones relevant to the Clerk's Tale are Cicero's reverence (d'Auvergne's obedience to 
superiors) and pietas or duty rendered to country and kin, especially parents.
20
 
 
The discussion of the parts of justice most useful for understanding the Clerk's Tale is in 
Peraldus' Summa de Virtutibus. After reviewing the divisions made by Cicero, Macrobius, 
Guillaume de Conches and Guillaume d'Auvergne, Peraldus proposes a synthesis of all four 
based primarily on d'Auvergne's scheme. Using the term /atria 'worship' introduced by Peter 
Lombard, Peraldus first discusses religion. He cites Cicero's definition but expands the classical 
concept to include not only external acts such as prayers and sacrifices but also the heartfelt 
acknowledgement of God's sovereignty through faith, hope and charity. Peraldus continues to 
consider humankind's debt to God in his discussion of the obedience (Cicero's reverence) owed 
to superiors, including the Creator. By voluntary obedience to the precepts and mandates of 
superiors, an individual sacrifices his or her will. Through a dual definition of propria voluntas 
'one's own will', Peraldus emphasizes that such obedience must be rendered to God as well as to 
human superiors: 
 
Et notandum quod propria voluntas dupliciter accipitur: uno enim modo dicitur propria voluntas: voluntas 
quae non est Deo subiecta: & secundum hoc abnegatio propriae voluntatis sit, cum voluntas nostra divinae 
voluntati subijcitur. Alio vero modo dicitur propria voluntas: voluntas quae non est subiecta homine: & 
secundum hoc propria voluntas abnegatur in eo qui voto se obligans homini voluntatem suam subdit 
voluntati humanae ... 
21
 
Justice thus requires obedience both to the Creator and to those fellow-creatures to whom one is 
obliged, especially by vows. Peraldus further identifies the human superiors who must be obeyed 
in his chapter on the parts of this virtue. After dividing obedience into reprehensible and 
commendable, he gives as examples of the latter type the natural obedience of children to their 
parents and the contractual obedience of wives to their husbands. However, Peraldus also warns 
against the reprehensible act which occurs when one follows a superior's command to do evil. 
Citing the authority of Gregory the Great, Bernard and Augustine, he insists that wrongdoing 
cannot be justified in the name of obedience.
22 
 
Peraldus' discussion of these two parts of justice, religion and obedience (reverence), clarifies the 
resonance which the Clerk's Tale had for its mediaeval audiences. Petrarch's retelling of 
Boccaccio's narrative about a dutiful wife as a religious allegory seems less incongruous if we 
recognize that obedience both to husband and to God were regarded as species of justice by 
mediaeval moralists. And Chaucer's clever manipulation of the literal and figurative modes of his 
tale is less bewildering if we know the traditional distinction which Peraldus makes between 
reprehensible and commendable obedience. The first clue to Chaucer's interest in this issue of 
lawful obedience occurs in the Prologue to the Clerk's Tale. The Clerk consents to the Host's 
request for a tale with the dutiful response: 
 
 
 
The Clerk's words not only foreshadow the many acts of compliance with another's will within 
the tale, but also raise the issue so crucial in modern attempts to interpret the actions of Walter 
and Griselda: to what extent is it just and reasonable to demand and to give obedience? 
 
The paradigm of voluntary compliance to the will of another in the Clerk's Tale is Griselda. That 
she was already regarded as an example of obedience is clear from the title given to Petrarch's 
narrative, De Insigni Obedientia et Fide Uxoris. Nonetheless, Chaucer intensifies the theme of 
Griselda's voluntary submission by amplifying or adding to the Latin and French versions. As 
Severs shows, the motive for Chaucer's revisions in his characterization of Griselda 'is to 
heighten [her] humble obedience to the will of her lord and husband'.
24 
 
As in his sources, Chaucer's Griselda places herself under a twofold obligation of justice to 
Walter. In agreeing to become his wife, she accepts not only the marital duty to obey her 
husband, but also Walter's requirement that she never complain against his demands (IV 35 1-7). 
Echoing Mary's response to Gabriel, Griselda says: 
 
 
Thus Griselda twice pledges to conform her will to Walter's. 
 
Throughout her trials, Chaucer augments the obedience of Griselda already so marked in his 
sources. For example, in the meeting with Walter preceding the seizure of her son, Chaucer adds 
to Griselda's profession of obedience what seems to be a cold-hearted statement of acquiescence 
to her husband's cruelty: 
 
 
The final qualifying phrase, however, indicates that Griselda accedes only because of her double 
vow to Walter. In the next stanza, taken from the sources, she declares her self-abnegation. 
 
 
Even when Walter renounces her to take another wife, Chaucer insists that although Griselda 
perceives his cruelty, she nonetheless reaffirms her vow to him (IV 85 z-6i). That Griselda can 
still love Walter despite her awareness of his harshness demonstrates, as Severs observes, that 
her obedience is not the submission of a stupid or spineless wife, but that of a sentient individual 
who nevertheless voluntarily submerges her will in that of another.²
5
 
 
While Chaucer had only to augment the evidence of Griselda's justice in his sources, he found it 
necessary to alter radically the tale assigned to the Physician to indicate Virginia's conformity to 
the mediaeval conception of another cardinal virtue, temperance. As several critics have already 
observed, Chaucer transforms the narratives of Livy and Jean de Meun, which concentrate on the 
lustful injustice of Appius and the uncompromising integrity of Virginius, into one emphasizing 
the pathetic innocence of Virginia.
26
 Although sometimes amplifying hints from Le Roman de la 
Rose, Chaucer adds approximately 176 original lines, more than half of his tale. Unique to his 
version are the long description of Virginia, partially adapted from an unrelated section in Le 
Roman de la Rose (VI 9-71, 105-17); the admonition to governesses and parents (VI 72-104); the 
dramatization of Virginia's murder by her father (VI 207-5 3); and the Physician's moral (VI 277-
86). Through all of these additions, Chaucer changes the meaning of the tale; he begins this 
transformation in the initial description by presenting Virginia as a paragon of temperance. 
 
In relating his characterization of Virginia to the cardinal virtue of temperance, Chaucer found an 
effective solution to a difficult problem. The primary definition of temperance in the Middle 
Ages derives from Cicero's De Inventione: `Temperantia est rationis in libidinem atque in alios 
non rectos impetus animi firma et moderata dominatio.'
27
 This concept of temperance as the 
rational restraint of illicit desires, especially carnal ones, is repeated by most of the mediaeval 
commentators on the four cardinal virtues, including such influential ones as Augustine, 
Macrobius, Guillaume de Conches, Aquinas and Peraldus.
28
 As a poet, however, Chaucer faced 
special problems in delineating such resistance to illicit carnal desires, for how does an artist 
portray an inner quality evinced only by the lack of particular vices? In order to depict Virginia's 
temperance dramatically, Chaucer would have to present her as compromised by lust; to show 
her in the act of restraining her carnal desires, she would first have to experience them. Such a 
lapse, however, would have severely diminished her innocence; a Virginia tempted by Appius, 
though ultimately not seduced, would obviously not suit Chaucer's purpose. 
 
In order to avoid this problem, Chaucer chooses another method of manifesting Virginia's 
temperance. Rather than portray the action of the cardinal virtue by dramatizing her resistance to 
her own lust, he presents a static description which asserts her possession of the species or parts 
of temperance. A comparison of his encomium with the subdivisions of this cardinal virtue 
derived from Cicero and Macrobius as well as the six attributes of virginity specified by Peraldus 
demonstrates the correspondence between Chaucer's characterization of Virginia and mediaeval 
analyses of this virtue. Because Virginia's qualities in VI 39-71 are those traditionally associated 
with temperance, it is difficult to ascertain a single source for these lines; however, it is clear that 
whatever his source, Chaucer's addition is intended to indicate that Virginia exemplifies this 
third cardinal virtue.
29
 
 
In De Inventione Cicero identifies three parts of temperance: continence, clemency and 
modesty.
30
 In his Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis Macrobius lists nine species of temperance: 
modesty, sense of shame, abstinence, chastity, sense of honour, moderation, frugality, sobriety 
and purity.
31
 Throughout the Middle Ages these two groups of subdivisions were often 
combined; treatises modelled on Cicero's list frequently cited items from Macrobius and vice 
versa.
32
 Furthermore, analyses of temperance often included discussions of virginity since it was 
considered a manifestation of this cardinal virtue. According to Peraldus, for example, virginity 
is a species of continence.
33
 He amplifies the Ciceronian category by articulating six 
characteristics of virginity: sobriety, labour, humility, custody of the senses, modesty of 
conversation and avoidance of the occasion of sin. The inclusion of modesty and sobriety in two 
different lists and the similarity of continence and moderation reduce these eighteen subdivisions 
to fifteen. Well known throughout the Middle Ages, these subdivisions of temperance correlate 
closely with the specific virtues Chaucer assigns to Virginia (VI 39-71, 105 16). 
 
Chaucer bases his initial description of Virginia's virtues on Macrobius' list, for Virginia clearly 
possesses eight of the nine parts of temperance. Making the transition between Nature's 
panygeric and the narrator's encomium, Chaucer begins by identifying Virginia's virtue as the 
primary cause of her praiseworthiness: 
 
 
 
Chaucer's statement attributes to Virginia an essential mark of temperance, Macrobius' honestas 
or sense of honour. As Aquinas observes, honestas is best defined as worth or virtue deserving 
honour; quoting Isidore of Seville, he explains: 
 
 
Virginia's integrity renders her praiseworthy and indicates that she possesses the first Macrobian 
part of temperance, a sense of honour. Complementing this is her strong sense of shame 
(Macrobius' verecundia): `Shamefast she was in maydens shamefastnesse' (VI 5 5). Chaucer also 
refers to her abstinence (VI 45) and her sobriety (VI 58-6o), those aspects of temperance which 
regulate the pleasures of eating and drinking. The young girl's virginity attests two of Macrobius' 
other parts of temperance, chastity and purity: 'As wel in goost as body chast was she; / For 
which she floured in virginitee' (VI 43 -4). 
 
In describing the heroine of the Physician's Tale, Chaucer follows the example of many 
mediaeval moral treatises by augmenting Macrobius' list with Cicero's. In addition to these six 
characteristics derived from the Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis, Chaucer ascribes to Virginia 
the three Ciceronian qualities of temperance: continence, clemency and modesty. In attributing 
attemperaunce (VI 46) to Virginia, Chaucer seems to be influenced by Cicero's conception of 
continence not simply as an abstinence from sexual activity but, more generally, as self-
restraint.
35
 In this sense Cicero's continence is synonymous with Macrobius' moderation, and 
Chaucer uses attemperaunce to indicate their similarity. Likewise, Chaucer probably derives 
Virginia's pacience (VI 46) from Cicero's dementia. Mediaeval moralists often interpreted 
dementia both as forbearance in anger (Cicero's interpretation) and as endurance of adversity.
36
 
Given Virginia's youth and humility, the latter sense is more suitable and 'patience' an apt 
translation of dementia. 
 
Chaucer devotes half the lines in the encomium to a description of Virginia's modesty, an aspect 
of temperance articulated by both Cicero and Macrobius. He praises her humility (VI 45), her 
propriety of bearing and array (VI 47), her discreet speech (VI 48-5 4) and her efforts to avoid 
situations 'That been occasions of daliaunces' (VI 6i-6). After warning governesses and parents 
to keep close watch over young girls in their charge, Chaucer concludes by praising Virginia's 
custody of herself: 
 
 
These kinds of behaviour, all manifestations of modesty, correspond to four of the aspects of 
temperance which Peraldus finds especially appropriate for virgins: humility, custody of senses, 
modesty of conversation and avoidance of the occasion of sin. 
 
Peraldus' discussion of the six parts of virginity also explains the final puzzle in Chaucer's 
description of Virginia, the reference to her constancy and busyness. The second of these 
qualities correlates with Peraldus' labor, the means through which virgins must resist the 
temptations of idleness. As Chaucer puts it, Virginia is 'Constant in herte, and evere in bisynesse 
/ To dryve hire out of ydel slogardye' (VI 56-7). In this context, Virginia's constancy, the only 
characteristic not yet accounted for, perhaps corresponds to Macrobius' frugality (parcitas). 
Through the influence of the Moralium Dogma Philosophorum, parcitas came to be defined in 
the later Middle Ages as `mensuram refectionis non excedere'.
37
 It is possible that Chaucer 
decided to refer to such self-restraint as an inner state of frugality or constancy of desire which 
keeps the appetites and passions in check. 
 
It must certainly be more than coincidental that Chaucer's encomium on Virginia so closely 
resembles the subdivisions of temperance derived from Cicero and Macrobius. The traditional 
nature of this material renders it improbable that scholars will agree on a specific source for VI 
39 71 and 105—i6 of the Physician's Tale. More importantly, though, the similarity between the 
conventional subdivisions of temperance and Chaucer's description establishes that he added this 
encomium to emphasize Virginia's role as a paragon of temperance. 
 
The last example of a heroine modelled after a cardinal virtue occurs in the second narrative 
which the pilgrim Chaucer tells, the Tale of Melibee. Ascertaining the poet's purpose in this tale, 
however, poses unique problems, because the Tale of Melibee is a close translation of its source, 
Renaud de Louens's adaptation of Albertano of Brescia's Liber Consolationis et Consilii. 
Chaucer thus leaves no clues to his intention except for the fact that he was satisfied to 
incorporate this tale into his collection virtually unrevised. Perhaps one of the reasons for his 
satisfaction was that Renaud's Livre de Mellibee et Prudence already appropriately develops the 
theme Chaucer wanted to present. While he had to revise the other moral tales to clarify the 
relationship between the female protagonist and the cardinal virtue which she manifests, the 
portrayal of Prudence in Renaud's redaction of the Liber Consolationis et Consilii is obviously 
based on mediaeval conceptions of this virtue. However, because Renaud (and Chaucer 
following him) omits chapters vi—ix, in which Albertano explicitly discusses the nature of 
prudence, modern readers of the Tale of Melibee do not always recognize how the definitions of 
this cardinal virtue inform the characterization of Melibee's wife. 
 
Albertano exhibits remarkable ability in compiling and combining definitions of prudence from 
the three authorities which dominated Christian moral philosophy throughout the Middle Ages: 
Cicero, Macrobius and the Pseudo-Seneca, Martin of Braga. In chapter vi Albertano presents a 
definition of this virtue: `"Prudentia est rerum bonarum et malarum utrarumque discretio" cum 
electione boni et fuga mali.'
38
 This definition combines Cicero's two most influential expositions 
of this cardinal virtue. Most often cited in the Middle Ages was his brief discussion in De 
Inventione which defined prudence and identified its parts. Prudentia est rerum bonarum et 
malarum neutrarumque scientia. Partes eius: Memoria, intellegentia, providentia.'
39
 The second 
Ciceronian definition, whose influence steadily increased during the mediaeval period, derives 
from the more thorough and detailed analysis of the four cardinal virtues in De Officiis. In the 
summary at the end of Book i, Cicero distinguishes between philosophical knowledge, sapientia 
or sophia, and practical knowledge or prudentia. Wisdom `rerum est divinarum et humanarum 
scientia'; it is especially concerned with causes. By contrast, prudence 'est rerum expetendarum 
fugiendarumque scientia'.
40
 This definition, unlike the one in De Inventione, ascribes to prudence 
not only the intellectual ability to discriminate but also the volitional disposition to seek or avoid 
good and evil.
41 
 
In the late twelfth century the concepts of prudence as intellectual discrimination from De 
Inventione and as volitional disposition from De Offciis were combined by Alain de Lille, and it 
is this conflation of Cicero's two definitions that Albertano cites in chapter vi of the Liber 
Consolationis et Consilii. Except for his reversal of the two final prepositional phrases, 
Albertano's definition of prudence is an exact quotation of Alain's: 'Prudentia est rerum bonarum 
et malarum utrarumque discretio cum fuga mali et electione boni.'
42 
 
These two Ciceronian conceptions explain Albertano's characterization of Prudence, especially 
as she contrasts with Boethius' Philosophia. In accord with Cicero's distinction between the two 
kinds of knowledge, Prudence's lessons are practical rather than abstract, moral rather than 
metaphysical. Boethius' Philosophia appropriately teaches her pupil about the nature of causation 
in order to help him withdraw from the realm of fortune. Albertano's Prudence, on the other 
hand, gives pragmatic advice and seeks to influence Melibeus' action in the world. Thus, in 
keeping with both Cicero's definitions, Prudence not only informs her husband about good and 
evil but also tries to persuade him to choose the former and avoid the latter; she guides both his 
mind and his will.
43 
 
Although the Ciceronian tradition explains Prudence's role as Melibeus' teacher, another popular 
conception of this cardinal virtue accounts for the specific lessons Albertano ascribes to her. In 
providing her husband with the general principles for eliciting and evaluating counsel, this 
character conforms to the definition of prudence in the Formula Honestae Vitae. This sixth-
century treatise, attributed to Seneca and extant in over two hundred manuscripts from before 
1500, was, according to Tuve, as important for the Middle Ages as Aristotle's Nicomachean 
Ethics was for the Renaissance.
44
 The discussion of prudence in the Formula Honestae Vitae is 
eclectic, incorporating material from Cicero's De Inventione and De Officiis together with 
original ideas. Although Albertano cites the authority of the Formula on fifteen different 
occasions, his most important quotation of Pseudo-Seneca is the description of prudent 
behaviour: Prudentis enim proprium est consilia examinare, nec cito credulitate ad falsa 
prolabi.'
45
 Obviously, the idea that the special province of this cardinal virtue is to evaluate 
counsel accounts for the topics of Prudence's discourse in the Tale of Melibee. 
 
Judging by the nature of things rather than the opinions of others, Prudence demonstrates the 
moral discretion ascribed to the virtue she exemplifies in the De Inventione and the Formula 
Honestae Vitae. And advising her husband to flee evil and choose good, she enacts the volitional 
influence Cicero associates with prudentia in De Officiis. Because Albertano's Prudence already 
conforms so well to the mediaeval definitions of the cardinal virtue whose name she bears, 
Chaucer did not need to revise Renaud's Livre de Mellibee et Prudence to accord with the three 
other narratives about virtuous women. 
 
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, Chaucer probably chose each of the four tales under 
consideration because the behaviour of its female protagonist suggests an affinity to one of the 
four cardinal virtues; he indisputably revised each tale, as necessary, to enhance this 
identification. However, in revealing how mediaeval conceptions of the cardinal virtues inform 
Chaucer's characterization of these good women, I do not wish to reduce poetry to philosophy. 
Despite their extraordinary manifestations of virtue, all these figures, except perhaps Prudence, 
remain literal characters rather than personifications. As others have noticed, Chaucer dramatizes 
the suffering of these virtuous women with a realism and pathos that force the reader to 
acknowledge the personal toll of their ordeals.
46
 In each case, the poet has, in ways I cannot 
investigate in the limits of this article, put moral authority to the test of human experience. 
Recognizing the influence of moral philosophy on the narratives of the Man of Law, the Clerk, 
the Physician and Chaucer's pilgrim persona does not exhaust the meaning of these tales; rather, 
the unwarranted suffering of their four virtuous protagonists suggests that in these narratives 
Chaucer explores the tension between philosophy and literature as modes of understanding the 
human condition. 
 
NOTES 
I am grateful to the University of North Carolina at Greensboro for a research leave which 
enabled me to write the first version of this essay. 
1. Hoccleve's Works: The Regement of Princes and Fourteen Minor Poems, ed. by 
Frederick J. Furnivall, SETS, ES, 7z (London, 1897), lines 2087 8. 
2. J. D. Burnley, Chaucer's. Language and the Philosophers' Tradition (Cambridge, 1979), 
p. 9. 
3.  In stating that Chaucer's characterization of his four heroines is influenced by the 
cardinal virtue tradition, I do not wish to imply that he knew or was alluding to particular 
texts, but simply that he was familiar with the standard definitions which were based on 
these auctoritates. In Summa Virtutum de Remediis Anime, ed. by Siegfried Wenzel, 
Chaucer Library (Athens, Ga, 1984), pp. 7 8, the editor explains that the four cardinal 
virtues, which the Fathers had adapted from the pagan philosophers, were a stable series 
throughout the Middle Ages even though the lists of remedial virtues exhibited a good 
deal of variation. The reader should therefore expect not a close verbal correspondence 
between quotations from mediaeval moralists and Chaucer's text, but rather a more 
general resemblance between the conventional meaning of the virtue and the behaviour of 
the female protagonist exemplifying it. The best introduction to the mediaeval tradition of 
the four cardinal virtues is Rosemond Tuve, Allegorical Imagery: Some Medieval Books 
and their Posterity (Princeton, NJ, 1966), ch. ii. For a survey of scholastic moral theology 
about the cardinal virtues through Thomas Aquinas, see D. ()don Lottin, Psychologie et 
morale aux XII
e
 et XIIIe siècles, 6 vols. in 8 (Gembloux; Louvain, 1942 ), Vol. III. P. M. 
Kean, The Art of Narrative (Volume II of Chaucer and the Making of English Poetry) 
(London, 1972), pp. 173-85, suggests that the cardinal virtues tradition informs the 
theme of the nobility of humanity and influences Chaucer's characterization throughout 
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